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Abstract Calls for the permanent deployment of substantial combat forces in East-
ern European naTo states, primarily in the Baltics and poland, have been part of the 
debates on strategy among the member states for years. in the wake of the ukrainian 
crisis, the defence capabilities of the Eastern European allies must undoubtedly be 
strengthened. However, in light of the yet-to-be-implemented measures that the allies 
decided upon at the wales Summit, a more general shift of international security chal-
lenges towards ‘hybrid’ warfare scenarios, russia’s centrality in the Middle East peace 
process and the long-term viability of the alliance, permanently deploying substantial 
combat forces in Eastern Europe would not strengthen the security of Europe and the 
coherence of naTo.
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Challenges to NATO’s security
in the wake of russia’s aggression in connection with the territorial integrity of ukraine, 
calls for a permanent naTo deployment of substantial combat units in Eastern Euro-
pean member states have been widespread. richard Shirreff has argued that a per-
manent presence in the Baltics would ‘deter any russian encroachment’ and that 
a permanent land presence is ‘required to prevent any russian coup de main opera-
tion that could achieve its aims before any naTo reserves are able to react’ (Benitez 
et al. 2016, 7). polish president andrzej Duda has argued that naTo would be 
treating poland like a ‘buffer zone’ between the west and russia if it did not agree to 
the deployment of permanent bases on its eastern flanks (Foy 2015).
The polish and Baltic calls for a permanent deployment of substantial combat forces 
derive from various considerations. First, poland and the Baltics have had a long and 
troublesome history with their eastern neighbour. russian aggression towards these 
states has extended into the post–Cold war era, mostly consisting of attempts to pres-
surise the countries into a friendlier attitude towards Moscow’s interests. a second 
reason for the scepticism of these states relates to the content of the naTo–russia 
Founding act of 1997. under this agreement both sides pledged to seek long-term sta-
bility in the Euro-atlantic security space through cooperation and confidence-building 
measures. However, poland, the Baltic states and other Eastern European naTo 
members have had little influence on this naTo–russian settlement, which was initially 
based on the desire to slowly integrate russia into alliance structures.
in the past, divergent threat perceptions have led to frictions within the alliance. noet-
zel and Schreer (2009) observed that the alliance has developed into a three-tiered 
organisation, with the Eastern European states (mainly poland, the Baltic states 
and the Czech republic) urging for a tougher line towards russia; the status quo 
powers (Germany and France) pushing for a more nuanced position; and the ‘reformers’ 
(Great Britain and the uS) supporting a more global role for naTo, beyond the immedi-
ate task of defending Eastern Europe. Since 2014, this division has been marginalised. 
in particular, Germany’s stance towards russia has become significantly more scepti-
cal and confrontational (Forsberg 2016). Given the potential ramifications of russia’s 
destabilising efforts, the urge to strengthen European and naTo defences against a 
potential replication of russia’s hybrid warfare strategy is undoubtedly essential for the 
reassurance of the alliance and the protection of the most vulnerable allies in the East. 
Europe’s defence efforts must continue to stress the liberal character of the post–Cold 
war order without outside interference.
However, effective military deterrence and appropriate defence infrastructures 
do not necessarily translate into an abrogation of the naTo–russia Founding act 
of 1997 (even though russia has violated the prerogatives of its commitments). The 
case against substantial permanent deployments of naTo troops in Eastern Europe 
is not derived from the lack of a need to prepare against russian aggression, but from 
the sufficiency of current military measures (if thoroughly implemented), the changing 
nature of the threat in the post–Cold war environment, and the fundamental challenges 
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posed by revolutions and wars in the Middle East, as well as the need to balance the 
security requirements of all 28 naTo member states. unless a broader political and 
economic modus vivendi between naTo and russia can be reached, Europe remains 
vulnerable to russian aggression irrespective of the forces that the alliance deploys on 
its soil. as Mölling and Major (2015) have argued, ‘Hectic activism risks a two-pronged 
security policy miscalculation: first, overemphasising the military dimension, both in the 
analysis of threats and the choice of instruments; and, second, planning to fight the last 
war all over again.’
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NATO 
response force: a viable deterrent
whilst most measures that naTo has agreed upon are currently being implemented, 
some of the measures have already substantially increased the operational readiness 
of the alliance. The Very High readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) will be capable of 
reacting within a couple of days to external acts of aggression. For naTo’s land-based 
VJTF units, three parallel forces (Stand-up, Stand-by and Stand-down) are currently 
being set up. Yet-to-be-defined sea-based, air-based and special forces will accompany 
the land-based component of the rapid reaction force. one of the greatest advantages 
of the VJTF is its flexibility with regard to potential battle areas. as General philip Breed-
love, Supreme allied Commander Europe, has argued, the VJTF is ‘a clear indication 
that our alliance has the capability and will to respond to emerging security challenges 
on our southern and eastern flanks’ (naTo 2015).
in June 2015, naTo’s defence ministers also agreed to increase the naTo response 
Force from 19,000 to 40,000 soldiers. additionally, the Multi-national Corps northeast 
is undergoing an upgrade to the status of a regional headquarters, which will bring over-
sight of the regional naTo Force integration units as well as land-based VJTF forces 
into its purview. These measures are being accompanied by extended air policing by 
naTo in the Baltics to deter russian aggression in the short term. adaptation 
measures for the naTo response Force also include the implementation of naTo Force 
integration units in poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, romania and Bulgaria. Germany 
and the uS have also initiated the Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training 
initiative, seeking to foster the military resilience of poland and the Baltic states.1
The uS has implemented the European reassurance initiative, enabling the uS 
both to maintain a continual rotational unit presence in the Baltics and poland and to 
increase the number of bilateral exercises it carries out (Glatz and Zapfe 2016, 2–3). 
in June 2015, uS Secretary of Defense ashton Carter announced the pre-positioning 
of approximately 250 armoured vehicles in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of this 
1 To appropriately frame current measures, naTo is operating under a formula of ‘persistent presence’, 
implying the continual presence of naTo units for joint and combined exercises and training on a rotational 
basis.
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military equipment is deployed in the territory of the new member states. The equipment 
of the so-called European activity Set will serve to supply a Heavy Brigade Combat 
Team of up to 5,000 soldiers, both for exercises in the context of the rotating presence 
and for deployments in the region.
The above measures serve to significantly augment the security of the Eastern Euro-
pean allies, even though Glatz and Zapfe (2015) have rightly pointed out that the Bal-
tic states remain under the threat of potential russian aggression. in fact, at its core, 
naTo’s policy has sought to refrain from openly breaking the naTo–russia Council 
commitment to not station substantial military combat forces on a permanent basis in 
Eastern Europe. The steps taken to ensure a substantial strengthening of naTo’s mili-
tary capabilities whilst preserving the ‘western’ commitment of the 1990s has led some 
observers to conclude that naTo’s policies are contradictory (Glatz and Zapfe 2015).
However, such observation disregards the close connection between military 
preparedness and the need to pursue political solutions. without a broad modus vivendi 
with russia on conventional arms control and military codes of conduct, the Baltics 
would remain vulnerable to russian aggression irrespective of the deployment of sub-
stantial naTo combat forces. whilst the potential risks for the Baltic states continue to 
exist and should not be treated lightly, a more promising approach would link deploy-
ments in the Baltics and poland with enhanced Euro-atlantic arms control efforts. a 
report by the European Leadership network (Kulesa 2016) has argued that a more sta-
ble security framework with russia is most likely if both sides participate in confidence-
building measures. Such measures could include the enhanced predictability of military 
exercises, dialogues on military doctrines and the restraining of forward conventional 
military deployments, as well as the downscaling of the importance of nuclear weap-
ons and establishing a shared understanding of the new mutually binding rules (Kulesa 
2016). as richter (2014) has argued, the Euro-atlantic security space would also ben-
efit from the revival of an ambitious conventional arms control regime that could poten-
tially eliminate the blurry characterisation of ‘substantial combat forces’ in the framework 
of the naTo–russia Council. in the past decade, russia has signalled its willingness 
to enter into mutual arms control agreements, primarily because they would guarantee 
Moscow an equal status in its relationship with the west and facilitate defence planning 
in Moscow in light of the substantial economic challenges it faces in the years to come.
rather than unilaterally abrogating the pledges of the Founding act in the field of 
combat force deployments, these could be utilised as a bargaining chip should Moscow 
prove unwilling to enter into a mutually acceptable conventional arms control regime. 
However, this option should only be used at the end of the process, not at the begin-
ning. in the current absence of naTo–russian negotiations, a transitional compromise 
could be found by establishing an adequate infrastructure for the substantial pre-posi-
tioning of military equipment without the deployment of actual forces. irrespective of the 
permanent deployment of naTo combat forces in Eastern Europe, naTo’s deterrence 
posture would significantly increase if European naTo states qualitatively improved the 
components of national armed forces (Glatz and Zapfe 2015, 7).
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The changing nature of the threat
at the same time, purely military measures against potential russian aggression will not 
suffice to account for the evolving threat to naTo’s security. in fact, focusing on hard 
military factors might undermine necessary adaptation to the more likely conflict sce-
narios of the future. Today, russia’s foreign policy behaviour is mainly derived from its 
weakness. Deyermond (2014) has argued that russia, ‘with a narrow economic base, 
a declining population and continuing security troubles inside its borders . . . doesn’t 
look either as secure as other established, powerful states or as economically dynamic 
as the rising powers.’ From the russian perspective, Deyermond argues, all great 
power prerogatives have come under threat in the past two decades. The current rus-
sian approach thus originates in a predominantly defensive mindset that interprets the 
self-determination of the states on russia’s periphery, as well as western support of 
civil society movements in those states, as part of an ‘encroachment strategy’. Moscow 
translates this mindset into aggressive efforts to undermine state sovereignty, as well as 
attempts to sow disagreement among western audiences.
Based on russia’s persistent economic and relative military weakness, the central 
element of russia’s current strategy is an attempt to force the uS and the Eu onto 
russia’s playing field. in contrast to the Cold war, the development of russia’s cur-
rent foreign policy suggests that ‘hybrid warfare’ will be central to possible conflicts 
with Europe. Through a combination of military, political and economic tools—including 
cyber-attacks and enhanced intelligence measures—russia is pursuing an asymmetri-
cal strategy that antagonises the west without provoking a full-scale confrontation with 
naTo (Kiesewetter and Zielke 2015). as russian Chief of the General Staff Valery 
Gerasimov has argued, ‘The role of non-military means of achieving political and strate-
gic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of weapons in 
their effectiveness’ (Coalson 2014).
Mölling and Major (2015) have therefore argued that ‘The objective of using irregular 
tools is to exploit the weaknesses of the target community in order to destabilize a state 
and polarize its society. it expands the gray area between peace and conflict—force 
can still play a part, but is not directly attributable to any party to the conflict, nor does 
it have a clear military character.’ russia’s attempt to utilise regional and global institu-
tions (the Eurasian union and the un) to foster its security agenda can be interpreted 
as part of a broader development away from military conflicts towards escalation sce-
narios in which the global hyper-connectivity shifts confrontations towards areas such 
as economic warfare, the weaponisation of institutions, and physical and virtual infra-
structure competition (Leonard 2016). in fact, according to Monaghan (2013), russia’s 
greatest foreign policy achievements prior to the annexation of Crimea were the crea-
tion of a customs union and the Eurasian Economic union.
Given these broader trends and russia’s strategy to asymmetrically respond to 
western weaknesses, the societal, economic and democratic resilience of European 
states and populations will be as important as military preparations for russian aggres-
sion. ukraine would arguably have been less exposed to destabilising efforts from 
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within if the elites had fostered an economically successful free market economy and 
an inclusive societal approach in the post–Cold war decades. in this regard, the eco-
nomic vulnerability of ukraine is as alarming as its lack of military capability to counter 
russian aggression (petro and Speedie 2016). Likewise, from a broader perspective, 
media freedom, the independence of constitutional courts, the functioning of multicul-
tural societies and economic reforms in indebted European states are key to closing 
potential vulnerabilities to russian hybrid warfare strategies.
Cohesiveness of the Alliance
Lastly, rather than deepening the cohesiveness of naTo, a permanent stationing of 
naTo’s military equipment and troops in Eastern Europe might cause a rift within the 
alliance. whereas poland and the Baltic states have voiced their desire to permanently 
deploy substantial combat forces in Eastern Europe, other Eastern European member 
states have been more cautious in echoing such plans.
From Germany’s perspective, an abrogation of the naTo–russia Founding act would 
also raise doubts and questions about Berlin’s diplomatic resolve, which has so far 
been quite successful at navigating between imposing significant economic sanctions 
on the one hand, and serving as a mediator in the russo-ukrainian conflict on the other 
(Forsberg 2016). andrew Monaghan (2013, 200) has argued that Europe’s sanctions on 
Moscow have undermined russia’s actions, which he characterises as counterproduc-
tive as they ‘left ukraine severely injured but alive, and even more alienated from its 
former protector. The policy brought Moscow a whole set of new economic problems: in 
particular, it prompted the Eu to reinvigorate the slow and indecisive process of diversi-
fying hydrocarbon suppliers away from russia.’
in the run-up to the warsaw Summit at the beginning of July, multiple allies have 
called for a more ambitious strengthening of naTo engagement on its southern fron-
tiers. in contrast to a permanent stationing of military equipment in Eastern Europe, 
the existence of the VJTF sends a more balanced message to the whole of naTo as 
it avoids focusing on one single region of concern. Member states such as italy and 
France are seeking to place a greater focus on stability in Central and north african 
states such as Tunisia. again, this is not to say that naTo members should not be 
reassured. However, in contrast to permanent deployments, rapid reaction forces would 
not tilt the balance towards one single threat, but would keep more options open. The 
concept takes into account the justified security demands in Eastern Europe and South-
ern Europe, helps to balance the divergent security preferences within the alliance, and 
strengthens efforts to foster economic and military deterrence towards russia.
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Challenges in the Middle East and cooperation 
with Russia
in addition to setting the wrong priorities, the abrogation of the naTo–russia Coun-
cil pledges could undermine stabilisation efforts in the Middle East. whilst it would be 
wrong to neglect the fate of ukraine, in the face of the severe challenges to naTo’s 
coherence in the Turkish–russian conflict over Syria and the migration crisis, solu-
tions to the Syrian and iraqi civil wars are only possible if the west pursues coopera-
tion with russia. as anatol Lieven (2015) has recognised, an increasing number of uS 
intelligence and policymakers has realised that washington and naTo would benefit 
from cooperation with Moscow and other states in order to restructure iraq and Syria by 
implementing autonomous Sunni regions in Eastern Syria and northern iraq, as well as 
a Kurdish area in northern iraq. russian participation in Europe’s Middle East strategy 
is essential for two reasons: first, because russia has a highly effective air force based 
in Syria, no political solution can be reached without Moscow’s agreement. Second, 
because iran’s agreement to any settlement in Syria will also be essential, russia’s 
influence in Tehran will be necessary to its achievement (Lieven 2015).
preventing a further deterioration in the bilateral relationship will only be possible 
if Germany and the Eu as a whole preserve diplomatic and economic ties with both 
the long-standing naTo ally Turkey, as well as russia. whilst a naTo–russian rap-
prochement on Syria might play to russia’s desire to make up for its failures in ukraine 
(Lukyanov 2016), a confrontation with russia over the permanent deployment of naTo 
infrastructure in Eastern Europe would unnecessarily undermine diplomatic opportuni-
ties that could emerge when dealing with the Turkish–russian conflict.
Conclusion
as argued in this article, naTo’s responses in the wake of russia’s aggression have 
demonstrated the cohesiveness and willingness of its member states to defend them-
selves against Moscow’s aggression. However, naTo cannot provide economic and 
societal resilience. it is the Eu that must take the lead in this, by fostering political 
developments at the member-state level. as Mölling and Major (2015) have stressed, 
‘Most opportunities to take action on hybrid security are at the national and regional 
levels, putting particular responsibility for such policies on states.’
in the short term, a permanent naTo deployment could undermine uS–russian 
efforts to find common solutions in Syria without significantly enhancing the safety of the 
Baltic states. in contrast, a rapprochement between the uS and russia on the internal 
peace process in Syria might spill over into a more stable bilateral relationship between 
iran and Saudi arabia, thereby making the broader region more peaceful. The decision 
to permanently deploy significant military infrastructure in the Baltics and poland would 
unnecessarily jeopardise the Syrian peace process and the medium-term cohesiveness 
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of the transatlantic alliance, without adding much to the security of naTo’s Eastern 
European allies.
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